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Abstract:  
According to Basel II criteria, the use of external data is absolutely indispensable to 
the implementation of an advanced method for calculating operational capital. This 
article investigates how the severity and frequencies of external losses are scaled for 
integration with internal data. We set up an initial model designed to explain the loss 
severity. This model takes into account firm size, location, and business lines as well 
as risk types. It also shows how to calculate the internal loss equivalent to an external 
loss, which might occur in a given bank. OLS estimation results show that the above 
variables have significant power in explaining the loss amount. They are used to 
develop a normalization formula. 
A second model based on external data is developed to scale the frequency of 
losses over a given period. Two regression models are analyzed: the truncated 
Poisson model and the truncated negative binomial model. Variables estimating the 
size and geographical distribution of the banks’ activities have been introduced as 
explanatory variables. The results show that the negative binomial distribution 
outperforms the Poisson distribution. The scaling is done by calculating the 
parameters of the selected distribution based on the estimated coefficients and the 
variables related to a given bank. Frequency of losses of more than $1 million are 
generated on a specific horizon. 
 
Keywords: Operational risk in banks, scaling, severity distribution, frequency 
distribution, truncated count data regression models. 
 
Résumé: 
L’utilisation de données externes constitue une condition sine qua non dans 
l’implantation d’une méthode avancée de calcul de capital opérationnel, d’après les 
critères de Bâle II. Cet article vient répondre à plusieurs interrogations sur la mise à 
l’échelle des montants et des fréquences des pertes externes; et ce dans le but de 
les intégrer avec les données internes. Cette étude met en place un premier modèle 
explicatif des montants de pertes incluant la taille de l’entreprise, le lieu de la perte, 
les lignes d’affaires ainsi que les types de risque. Elle montre comment il est possible 
de calculer la perte interne équivalente à une perte externe, qui pourrait être subie au 
niveau d’une banque donnée. Les résultats de l’estimation par MCO montrent que 
ces variables ont un pouvoir significatif dans l’explication des montants de pertes. 
Ces dernières sont retenues pour le développement d’une formule de normalisation. 
Un deuxième modèle est développé pour la mise à l’échelle des fréquences des 
pertes qui pourraient avoir lieu durant une période déterminée à partir des données 
externes. Nous considérons deux modèles de régression, à savoir le modèle Poisson 
tronqué et le modèle binomial négatif tronqué avec composante de régression. Des 
variables estimant la taille et la répartition géographique des activités des banques 
ont été introduites comme variables explicatives dans le modèle. Les résultats 
montrent que la distribution binomiale négative domine la distribution Poisson. Ainsi, 
la mise à l’échelle se fait en calculant les paramètres de la distribution retenue à 
partir des coefficients estimés et des variables propres à une banque donnée. Il est 
donc possible de générer des fréquences de pertes de plus de 1 million de dollars 
sur un horizon déterminé. 
 
 
Mots Clés: Risque opérationnel des banques, mise à l’échelle, distribution de 
sévérité, distribution des fréquences, modèles de comptage tronqué avec 
composante de régression. 
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1. Introduction 
Over the recent years, there is an increasing interest from financial institutions to identify losses 
associated with operational risk. This is due to regulatory considerations according to Basel II 
accord and also due to the occurrence of huge operational losses recently. We can mention two 
examples of enormous operational losses sustained by the financial sector: $2.4 billion lawsuit 
CIBC sustained by the shareholders of Enron and a $690 million loss caused by a rogue trading 
activities at Allied Irish Banks. Add to these the case of Barings, the UK’s oldest bank; it went 
bankrupt following a rogue trading activities too occasioning a loss of $1.3 billion. These 
examples show the scope of this risk. They also serve as an imperative warning signal to 
financial institutions, which must define, measure, and manage this risk. Besides the huge losses 
it can cause, operational risk also threatens all the activities and operations of an institution. 
Operational events can be linked to people, processes, systems, and external events. However, 
operational risk has a varying degree of impact on all units within the institution. Given its scope 
and complexity, the management of operational risk has become  a necessity. 
Aware of its disruptive potential, regulatory authorities, in June 1999, opened a debate on the 
development of a management framework attuned to operational risk. Such a framework would, 
among other things, provide for an operational loss identification and measurement of 
operational regulatory capital. They seek to improve on the existing rules by aligning regulatory 
capital requirements more closely to the underlying risks that banks face. In other words, they 
ensure that there is sufficient capital to cover the unexpected losses.   
Research in this field is still in its embryonic stage. Hence, any and all developments will be of 
great use in helping financial institutions meet their short-term demands and they will also 
benefit other industries in their pursuit of medium-term goals. In the Basel II agreement, one of 
the approaches proposed for quantifying operational risk capital is the advanced method. The 
development of such a method requires a large database. The data can be drawn from different 
sources. Internal data are very useful in reflecting the real level of exposure to operational risk. 
Ideally, they should be the only source of statistical information. However, most bank’s internal 
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data collection process are still in its infancy stage, and there is not enough data especially those 
rare ,1 high impact losses to estimate the unexpected loss. . 
Recourse to external operational loss data is therefore essential in order to supplement internal 
data, especially those tail events, which are generally missing from internal data. It is thus 
justifiable to combine these possible severe losses with the losses of the internal database of a 
bank, so as to reduce their “surprise” effect (the unexpected) and to calculate adequate 
operational risk capital. Obviously, we cannot predict the exact amount of extreme losses, which 
have not yet occurred. However, based on the losses recorded in the banking sector, we can 
make a projection for a particular bank, if our scaling takes certain factors into account. 
Given this context and the fact that an external database is needed for the calculation of an 
operational risk capital with an advanced approach, the objective of this paper is to develop a 
robust method that can use external data to predict the severity as well as the frequency of losses, 
which a bank is exposed to. Several factors will be considered in explaining the number of losses 
and their severities for a given period. It is thus a matter of projecting the external losses having 
occurred in the industry to the level of just one bank. 
The method developed in this article has been tested on the data of an external base containing 
operational losses of more than $1 million. However, this method is applicable to any external 
database. A combination of external losses scaled with the internal data of a particular bank 
makes it possible to measure that bank’s exposure to operational risk. 
This article is organized as follows. The second section describes the different approaches used 
to measure capital; gives the sources and characteristics of the data; and takes a brief look at the 
scaling methods reported in the literature. A description of the data in the external base is 
presented in the third section. The fourth section states the model’s hypotheses. The model to be 
used in scaling the severity of losses is then developed in the fifth section. The next to last 
section develops the model for scaling frequencies. Finally, the study ends with a conclusion and 
a discussion of possible avenues of further research. 
                                                 
1 A rare loss is defined as one which results from a highly unlikely event. 
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2. Context 
2.1 Regulatory framework 
In 2001, the Basel Committee defined operational risk as being the risk of loss resulting from 
inadequate or failed internal processes, people and systems or from external events. Legal risk is 
also included, but the definition does not take into account strategic and reputational risk. With 
the Basel II accord, there is now a requirement for an amount of additional regulatory capital to 
cover operational risk. Regulatory authorities have identified three different methods of 
calculating this capital. The most advanced of these three methods shows greater sensitivity in its 
detection of risk. In this article, we use the advanced approach in dealing with our research 
problem. 
This more advanced and sophisticated approach relies on internal capital-calculation procedures 
adopted by banks. Regulatory authorities are very flexible concerning the method chosen, 
provided it combines adequately qualitative and quantitative criteria (internal data, relevant 
external data, scenario analysis, and business environment and internal control factors). The 
method selected must reflect the financial institution’s level of exposure to operational risk and 
must measure the unexpected loss correctly. 
Three options are proposed under the advanced approach: (1) the internal measurement approach 
(IMA); (2) the loss distribution approach (LDA); and (3) the Scorecard approach. In this study we 
focus on the loss distribution approach (LDA), which estimates unexpected loss or the 
operational value at risk by modeling the amounts and frequencies of operational losses. The 
correct combination of internal and external loss data is thus an important step to be considered 
in an advanced approach. 
2.2 Sources of external data and their potential biases 
Once scaled, external data can be combined with internal data to generate a database 
representing a particular bank’s risk profile. This plays a part in implementing the advanced 
approach. The sources of external data are still quite limited. But we can cite at least three: 
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 Public data obtained from reports in the media and magazines on losses of over $1 million. 
There are two bases of external data on the market (such as Fitch). The problem with this 
type of data is that the base only contains very severe losses having occurred in large 
financial institutions. Recourse to this type of base will not make up for the scarcity of data 
on certain types of risk (business disruptions and system failures), but it does supplement the 
base with data on extreme losses, which occur rarely. Such losses will form distribution tails, 
since the internal data of most financial institutions contain no historical record of large 
losses, which might occur. When combining internal and external data, special treatment is 
needed to correct data-linked biases. 
 Data provided by insurance brokers (such as Willis, Aon and Marsh) have to do with losses 
claimed by financial institutions. The major advantage of this source is its reliability. Since 
data of this sort are collected directly from financial institutions, there is minimum selection 
bias. However, this source has the disadvantage of containing different collection thresholds, 
sometimes unobservable, which hinge on variations in insurance policy deductibles. The 
second limitation of this source resides in the specific nature of the types of risk collected. In 
fact, only insurable losses will be included in this base. 
 Non-public data obtained by compiling internal data from banks, which have agreed to share 
their information, thus constituting a consortium, like ORX (Operational Riskdata Exchange 
Association). However, given the confidentiality of the information shared, only the statistics 
and analyses pertaining to the losses are available to participants. The advantage of this 
source of data is its reliability. The collection threshold is much lower than that of the 
preceding sources. This makes the loss amounts more comparable, especially when the 
member banks are almost of the same size. However, the major disadvantage of this source 
of data is that it does not allow event-by-event access to the losses. Therefore, these data can 
not be used to construct a base combining internal and external data. 
External data contain many biases, such as: 
 Selection bias: Only very large losses are published. This bias is linked to the nature of the 
databases available and is thus difficult to correct. 
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 Control bias: Losses come from banks with different control environments. There are 
unfortunately no variables capable of estimating quality control for the banks found in 
external bases. So, it is not possible to correct this bias with the information available. 
 Collection bias: When data are drawn from different sources, variations in thresholds may 
cause biases. Frachot and Roncalli (2002) and Baud, Frachot, and Roncalli (2002) describe 
how internal data can be compared with external data having different collection thresholds. 
 Scale bias: Losses come from banks of different sizes (assets, revenues, number of 
employees…) located in different countries. Our research is concerned with correcting this 
bias. 
2.3 Literature review 
Little research has been done to find a solution to the scale problem. Shih, Samad-Khan, and 
Medapa (2000) have introduced the institution’s size as the main scaling factor. They have 
shown that the relation between operational losses and firm size is non-linear. In effect, the 
relation between the logarithm of the scale factor and the loss amounts is stronger than the one 
between losses and the gross scale variable. Besides, a bank twice as large as another will not, on 
average, suffer losses two times higher than those of the smaller bank. Shih, Samad-Kahn, and 
Medapa (2000) effectively suppose the relation to be as follows: 
( )θα FRL ×=  
where: 
L: loss amounts; 
R: total revenue of the firm where the loss occurred; 
α : a scaling factor; 
θ : a vector representing all the risk factors not explained by R. ( )θF  is thus a multiplying 
residual term which is not explained by fluctuations in revenue. 
Taking the logarithm of this equation, we obtain a linear relation. It is thus possible to estimate 
the scaling factor ( )θα  and the logarithm of the function of the other factors F  which constitute 
the regression’s constant term. 
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Total revenue is the only risk factor included in the model, which estimates firm size. Most of 
the variability in losses is thus probably caused by other factors such as type of business line, 
quality of management, and effectiveness of the control environment. In this same study, it has 
been shown that size explains only a small portion (about 5%) of the loss amounts. 
Along the same lines, Hartung (2004) has developed a normalization formula, which makes it 
possible to calculate the equivalent of an external loss for a given bank. The formula used is  
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where: 
adjLoss : the loss amount adjusted for a given bank; 
orgLoss : the original loss amount for a reference bank; 
( )adjLossParamScal. : a scaling parameter for a given bank; 
( )orgLossParamScal. : a scaling parameter for a reference bank; 
a, b: adjustment factors such that [ ] [ ]1 ;0 ,1 ;1 ∈−∈ ba . 
The scaling parameter was assigned based on the cause of the event. Examples of this parameter 
are revenues, number of employees or quality of risk management. Hypotheses have been 
formulated concerning the value of the adjustment factors in relation to the scaling parameter. 
This scaling model’s limitations consist, on the one hand, in the lack of any theoretical 
justification of the formula used and, on the other hand, in the absence of a suitable method for 
estimating the adjustment factors. 
According to the study by Na (2004), the loss amount can be broken down into a common 
component and an idiosyncratic component. The component common to all the banks or 
business lines captures all the changes in the macroeconomic, geopolitical, and cultural 
environment, whereas the idiosyncratic component covers all the factors specifically linked to 
the line of business or the loss event. A power relationship has been inserted between this last 
component and a size estimator. A normalization formula has been developed to find, for lines of 
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business B1 and B2 of a given bank, the equivalent loss amount of a loss taken as a reference 
point. The formula is as follows: 
( ) ( )λλ
2,
2,
1,
1,
BT ticidiosyncra
BT
BT ticidiosyncra
BT
R
L
R
L =  
BiTL , : a loss amount having occurred at date T at the bank or in the business line Bi; 
( )
BiT ticidiosyncra
R
,
: the revenue of the bank or the business line at date T, constituting the only 
estimator of the idiosyncratic component; 
λ : a scaling factor. 
This model can be improved by introducing scaling factors other than firm size. Our model takes 
into consideration size, location, business line, and risk type. 
Once severity has been scaled, it is also important to determine the frequency with which 
normalized losses occur on a particular time horizon. Very few studies have attempted this type 
of scaling. Some studies have indeed developed normalization models for severity but without 
considering any scaling for frequencies (Shih, Samad-Khan, and Medapa, 2001; Hartung, 2004). 
Hartung (2004) groups the frequency of losses in four banks along a nine-year horizon. The bank 
used as a reference will have a distribution identical to that of the four banks grouped together. 
These banks are not necessarily comparable. Several factors enter into play when determining 
the frequency of losses. 
Na (2004) has developed a model for scaling frequencies which is equivalent to the one used to 
scale severity. This model stipulates that the frequency of losses can be broken down into a 
common and idiosyncratic component estimated by size. He concludes that size is a significant 
factor in explaining the variability of the number of losses. However, the model’s main 
limitation is that it does not account for the discrete character of the frequency data. 
In this study, we develop a count data regression model. A model of this type can take the 
discrete and non-negative character of the data into account. Two models will thus be tested: the 
Poisson and negative binomial (Klugman, Panjer, and Willmot, 1998; Cruz, 2001). The 
regression component contained in the model allows us to take into account certain factors 
related to the scaling procedure. 
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In the models used to describe discrete variables in the literature (Cox and Lewis, 1966; El 
Sayyad, 1973; Frome, Kutner, and Beauchamp, 1973; Hausman, Hall, and Griliches, 1984; 
Gouriéroux, Monfort, and Trognon, 1984), the endogenous variables are supposed to have a 
Poisson regression distribution. The parameter of this distribution is a function of the values of 
the exogenous variables. The choice of this model is justified when the dependent variable 
counts the occurrence of a given event over a specific period and when the usual hypotheses of 
the Poisson distribution are satisfied. 
Several applications of this model appear in the literature. It has been used to model such risks 
as: the number of patents received by a firm (Hausman, Hall, and Griliches, 1984), the number 
of visits to a doctor (Cameron, Trivedi, Milne, and Piggott, 1988) or the number of automobile 
or plane accidents (Dionne and Vanasse, 1989 and 1992; Dionne et al. 1997). The Dionne-and-
Vanasse application (1989) is the first to introduce a regression component in the insurance field, 
a field showing many similarities with operational risk. The number of accidents per individual 
is supposed to follow a Poisson distribution whose parameter will vary from one exposure unit to 
the next. This parameter actually depends on the characteristics of the units exposed. As 
discussed by Maddala (1983) and Cameron, and Trivedi (1986), the coefficients of these 
variables are estimated using the maximum likelihood method. 
The Poisson regression model supposes equidispersion (equality between the conditional average 
and variance). This restriction may not be compatible with operational loss data. Recourse to a 
negative binomial distribution2 compensates for this problem, since it allows overdispersion. The 
studies done by Dionne and Vanasse (1989 and 1992) and by Boyer, Dionne, and Vanasse 
(1991) have shown the superiority of the negative binomial regression model over the Poisson 
regression model when treating automobile accidents. The negative binomial regression model is 
now frequently used in the insurance literature. 
Once certain conditions have been met, it is possible to use maximum likelihood in estimating 
distribution parameters. But if the density is poorly specified, the estimators found with 
maximum likelihood will not be good. Gouriéroux, Monfort, and Trognon (1984a and 1984b) 
have proposed other methods to counteract this problem, such as the pseudo maximum 
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likelihood (PML) and the quasi-generalized pseudo maximum likelihood (QGPML). They have 
specified the conditions under which these PML and QCPML estimators from the linear 
exponential family of models will behave coherently when applied to non-truncated models. 
However, if the density of the negative binomial is correctly specified, the maximum-likelihood 
estimators will be more efficient than the PML and QGPML (Dionne and Vanasse, 1992). 
In modeling the number of operational losses, we shall apply these models, which have gained 
great popularity in the literature. These models make it possible to introduce information on the 
financial institution where the loss occurred. Exogenous variables reflecting the firm’s location 
and geographical distribution will help account for scaling. To our knowledge, this is the first 
time these models are being applied to operational risk and, more precisely, being used to scale 
the frequency of operational losses. However, we observe that the frequencies do exceed zero. 
We thus develop truncated Poisson and negative binomial regression models at point zero. The 
truncated densities of these models have been presented by Cameron and Trivedi (1998) and 
Gurmu (1991). Gurmu and Trivedi (1992) have developed overdispersion tests for the same 
models. 
3. Description of external data 
Fitch’s OpVaR database is made up of operational losses of US $1 million and over. This 
database contains losses from all industries. Since our only target is banks, the database was first 
screened to select only operational losses connected with financial institutions. 
The database contains the following types of information. 
1. Type of event, level 1: Types of risk defined by regulatory authorities. Under this 
heading we find: 
• External fraud 
• Internal fraud 
• Clients, products, and business practices 
• Employment, practices, and workplace safety 
• Execution, delivery and process management  
                                                                                                                                                             
2 This is a Poisson distribution whose random parameter follows the gamma distribution. 
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• Damage to physical assets 
• Business disruption and system failures 
Also available are types of events at levels 2 and 3, which offer greater precision and granularity. 
For example: discrimination and diversity as a sub event of the employment, practices, and 
workplace safety risk type. As type-3 events under the diversity and discrimination subtype we 
have, for example, discrimination due to age, sex, race, sexual orientation, and sexual 
harassment. 
2. The name of the parent company and that of the subsidiary; 
3. A detailed description of the loss event; 
4. The loss amount in local currency, in American dollars, and its real value (counting 
inflation); 
5. Date of the event. Since we are not always sure of the exact date (day and month); we use 
only the year of the event; 
6. Industry: Either financial services or public administration; 
7. Business unit, levels 1, 2, and 3: The first level makes the distinction between financial 
and non-financial institutions. In our case, we are only interested in the financial sector. 
Level 2 is concerned with financial institutions and makes the distinction between banks, 
insurance firms, investment banks, and other institutions. In level-3 business units, we 
find the lines of business defined by the Basel Committee. 
8. The country where the loss occurred. 
9. An identification code for each loss. 
10. Information on the institution where the loss occurred: total assets, total equity, total 
deposits, total revenues, and number of employees. 
It is worth mentioning that the firm-related information needed for some observations is missing. 
Since this information will be of key use in the scaling model later on, we are obliged to select 
only the loss data for which specific information on the firm is available. Moreover, 1.8% of 
losses occurred between 1981 and 1994 and averaged $130.31 M per event, whereas the losses, 
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which occurred later, averaged $67.15 M per event. We thus remove the events having occurred 
before 1994 from the external base because of a collection bias. Hence, 1,056 observations of 
losses of more than a million American dollars remain in the database. 
4. Hypotheses of the model 
We apply a theoretical model designed to scale severities and frequencies. The empirical 
application of scaling models to external data is of great help in showing the model’s simplicity 
and in producing results. It is clear that the database used is open to criticism for the reasons 
mentioned above. Since, for the moment, no better data sources exist, we will be guided by the 
following hypotheses in carrying out our analysis. The methodology used would admittedly be 
applicable to other bases, provided they contain the information required. 
 We suppose that the loss amounts recorded in the base as reported in the media are exact 
and factorial. The evaluation of losses is thus based neither on rumours nor predictions. 
 We suppose that all types of losses are as likely to be recorded in the base; there is thus 
no media effect related to certain types of risk. 
 We suppose that the external base provides all the losses of more than a million dollars 
for the financial institutions contained in it. 
 We suppose that there is no correlation between the amount of the loss and the 
probability of its being reported. The severity and frequency distributions are thus 
supposed to be independent. 
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5. Scaling model for external-loss amounts 
5.1 Theoretical scaling model 
The scaling mechanism depends on three fundamental hypotheses. The first is that the monetary 
loss can be broken down into two components: common and idiosyncratic or specific. The 
second stipulates a non-linear relation between the idiosyncratic component and the different 
factors composing it. The third and last hypothesis states that, aside from the factors controlled 
for the purpose of scaling, all the other non-observable factors (quality of control environment, 
etc.) are supposed to remain the same for all banks. 
Concerning the first hypothesis, we can suppose that the operational loss can be broken down 
into two components (Na, 2004, Na and al., 2006): a component common to all banks and an 
idiosyncratic component specific to each loss. The common component contains all the factors 
which, being independent of any specific bank’s activities, can have the same impact on all 
banks—thus making it a constant component for all loss events. It refers to the macroeconomic, 
geopolitical or cultural environment or even to human nature in general. 
The idiosyncratic component refers to the specific risk facing the financial institution or line of 
business. Some elements of this component are observable: bank size, type of risk, line of 
business or location of loss event. These could therefore be quantified or measured. But there are 
non-observable elements related to the control environment, which are difficult to quantify. 
These elements are not studied in this article. 
We can thus identify a loss amount as a function of these two components: 
 Lossi = f ((Compcommon), (Compidiosyncratic)i ). (1) 
The second hypothesis stipulates that the function f is non-linear. Na (2004) supposes that the f 
function is the product of a function of the common component and of a function of the 
idiosyncratic component. Now, since the common component is constant, we can model it with 
the parameter: 
 Lossi = Compcommon × g(Compidiosyncratic)i. (2) 
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As for function g, we draw on the study by Shih, Samad-Khan, and Medapa (2000) which 
supposes a power relationship between the loss amount and firm size. However, size (estimated 
by total assets) is not the only factor we use to determine the severity of losses. We add to it 
other factors expressed in the function h which follows: 
g(Compidiosyncratic) = Assetsa × h(factors). 
We can thus rewrite (2) as follows: 
Lossi = Compcommon × (Assetsa × h(factors)). 
To simplify the analysis, we suppose that: 
h(factors) = exp(∑
j
jb  factorsj). 
Thus, 
 Log(Lossi)  = Log(Compcommon) +  a Log(assetsi) + (∑
j
jb  factorsij).  (3) 
In order to explain the variability of the losses and to construct the scaling model, the different 
elements of the idiosyncratic component must be identified, since they play a role as factors 
explaining the severity of losses. 
5.2 Description of the variables 
The dependent variable is the logarithm of the operational losses. The statistics in Table 1a show 
that the average by loss event is evaluated at $67 million, with a standard deviation of $521 
million. The maximum of the losses is $16 billion. The loss amounts thus vary widely from quite 
substantial to catastrophic. 
The explanatory variables to be included in the model designed to explain the variation in the 
logarithm of losses are described below. Table 1 presents descriptive statistics of the losses in 
terms of these variables. 
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 Size: The base contains variables characterizing firm size. According to the results of the 
study by Shih, Samad-Khan, and Medapa (2000), size is weakly lined to the loss amount. 
Other variables must explain this variability. 
Many information on size are available, such as: total revenues, total assets, total 
deposits, number of employees, and total equity. However, since all these variables are 
correlated, we have chosen total assets (the variable most correlated with losses) as the 
estimator for size. Financial institutions having sustained losses reported in the database 
used differ greatly in size, varying from the smallest bank (with total assets of $43 
million) to the largest institution (with assets of $1,533,036 million). The average total in 
assets is evaluated at $270,681M. 
In Table 1a, we present the number of events, the average, and the standard deviation for 
losses according to size. We have thus classified the banks into three size categories: 
those with assets under $400 billion (smaller and medium size); those with assets 
between $400 and $800 billion (large size); and very large banks whose assets excess 
$800 billion (very large size). The results in the table show that average losses are much 
higher in the very large banks than in the others. But the average loss for large financial 
institutions is lower than that for small and medium size banks. 
We expect losses to increase with the size of the financial institution. So a natural 
catastrophe could, for example, cause more serious damage (losses) to a bank whose total 
assets are higher than those of another bank. Size could thus have a positive impact on 
the severity of losses. 
 Location: As losses do not all occur in the same country, a variable capturing the effect 
of location must be incorporated. Seeing differences in environment, legislation, etc., we 
expect this variable to be significantly linked to loss amounts. It is worth noting that 60% 
of the losses occurred in the United State, as compared to only 4% in Canada. This 
variation can be explained by the fact that the number of banks in the United States 
greatly exceeds that in Canada. The remaining proportion of losses has been divided 
between the countries of Europe and the rest of the world. 
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Table 1b presents statistics for losses according to location. We note that the average for 
operational losses differs according to the location where they occur, thus reflecting their 
different environments. It is worth mentioning that the average for losses in the United 
States is higher than that in Canada ($38 M Vs $9 M). And the environment designated 
Other (countries other than Canada, the United States and those in Europe) reports the 
highest average for losses ($163 M), thus making it the most risky. 
Seeking to define the link between size of financial institution and location, we present, 
in table 1c, statistics on the size of institutions according to the location where the losses 
occurred. We notice that the average for total assets is lower in Canada than in the United 
States and Europe. However, though the environment in countries designated Other is 
riskier (highest average losses), the institutions having suffered those losses are on 
average smaller than those located in the three other environments. Thus, there is no 
direct link between the financial institution’s size and the location where the losses 
occurred. Dummy variables (United States, Canada, Europe, and Others) capture the 
effect of the location of losses in one of the countries or continents mentioned above. 
 Line of business: We expect the business line to have an impact on the severity of losses. 
Certain units register higher losses than others, on average. Highlighting the line of 
business where the loss occurred can explain the severity of extreme losses. According to 
the statistics presented for seven business lines in table 1d, we see that two of them—
commercial banking (25%) and retail banking (33%)—account for 58% of the losses. 
And the average loss is much higher for commercial banking than for the other units. 
Based on the information collected by LDCE and QIS-43 from 27 financial institutions, 
the line of business retail banking accounts for 44% of the operational losses in the 177 
data on losses of over $1 M collected over the 2001-2004 period, whereas the line of 
business commercial banking accounts for only 9%. This gap can be explained either by 
the collection period (the LDCE study covers 4 years of losses, whereas the external base 
covers 11 years of reporting) or by the number of different financial institutions where 
                                                 
3 Loss Data Collection Exercise (LDCE) and Quantitative Impact Study-4 (QIS-4): two studies conducted by the 
U.S. federal bank and thrift regulatory  agencies to evaluate the impact of Basel II on the minimum regulatory 
capital required. 
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the losses occurred. The dichotomic variables for each line of business will thus capture 
the effect of the nature of its activity, when determining loss amounts. 
 Types of risk: Certain risk types are infrequent but extremely severe, whereas others are 
very frequent but of relatively weak severity. Table 1e shows that 44% of losses are of 
the client, products, and business practices type and that more than 40% of losses are 
divided between internal and external fraud. However, less than 0.5% of losses are of the 
damage to physical assets type and 0.5% are of the business disruptions and system 
failures type. The average loss is highest for the damage to physical assets risk type 
($115 M), whereas it is lowest for business disruptions and system failures ($5 M) 
The results of the LDCE and QIS-4 studies show a very great difference in relation to this 
distribution. In effect, 49% of losses are of the execution, delivery and process 
management type; 31% are of the clients, products, and business practices type; 7% of 
the external fraud type; and 3% of the internal fraud type. As for the types of risk 
damage to physical assets and business disruption and system failures, the proportion of 
losses is just as low as in the external base. 
Introducing dichotomic variables to capture this aspect of the risk type can be relevant in 
explaining the variability of the loss amounts. Thus, 7 variables will capture the “risk 
type” effect in our model. 
5.3 Linear regression 
To explain the degree of variability of external losses, we shall estimate the coefficients of the 
regression below. This will allow us to evaluate the common and specific components for each 
loss amount. The following regression follows from equation (3): 
 Yi = a0 + a1  Sizei + a2  USi + a3  Canadai + a4  Europei + + +ei (4) ij
j
j BLa∑
=
11
5
ij
j
j RTa∑
=
17
12
with: 
Yi: Log(lossesi); 
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a0: Common component; 
Sizei: Log(assetsi); 
USi: Binary variable assuming the value 1 if the loss occurred in the United States, otherwise 0; 
Canadai: Binary variable assuming the value 1 if the loss occurred in Canada, otherwise 0; 
Europei: Binary variable assuming the value 1 if the loss occurred in Europe, otherwise 0; 
The category omitted is Others; 
BLij: Binary variable assuming the value 1 if the loss occurred in the business unit j, otherwise 0; 
The category omitted is payment and settlement; 
RTij: Binary variable assuming the value 1 if the loss is of the risk type j, otherwise 0; 
The category omitted is business disruptions and system failures type of risk; 
ei: Deviation variable representing the non-observable specific component which is supposed to 
follow a normal distribution with parameters ( )2,0 σ . 
5.4 Results of the regression 
The Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) method is used to estimate the parameters. The results of this 
estimation are presented in Table 2. The adjusted R2adj is 10.63%. Though the value is low, it is 
better than the 5% found in the literature to date (Shih et al., 2000). Remember that it is difficult 
to capture certain non-observable factors, which are not present in the external base. 
Estimated by the logarithm of total assets, the size variable is significantly different than 0. The 
coefficient is positive, confirming the fact that the larger the firm, the higher its level of losses. 
The binary coefficients US and Canada are significantly different then 0. The negative sign must 
be interpreted in relation to the category Others (variable omitted). Comparing the coefficients 
US and Canada, we note that the United States’ environment is riskier than Canada’s. It is also 
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worth noting the even higher losses having occurred in the rest of the world where financial 
environments are less regulated than those in the United States, Canada, and Europe. 
The commercial banking variable is the only one linked to business line, which shows a 
significantly non-null impact at a 99% confidence level. The coefficient is positive, showing that 
losses for this type of risk are higher than for others. Finally, the clients, products, and business 
practices variable has significant explanatory power. This shows that the losses associated with 
this type of risk are higher compared to the others. 
5.5 Robustness tests for the size variable 
We start with a simple regression including only the size variable— a model similar to the one 
used by Shih et al. (2001). The other categories of variables are then added to this same model 
one by one in order to capture any possible additional effects and to test the stability of the 
parameters. 
The results show that size plays a very small part in explaining the level of losses. Model 1 in 
Table 3 actually shows an R2adj of 0.6%. This statistic is sharply improved (to 4.32%) once the 
variables associated with location are introduced. It should be mentioned that the values of the 
coefficients estimated remain stable and significantly different from 0 when compared to the 
basic model. Model 3 adds variables estimating the impact of the line of business where the loss 
occurred. The adjusted determination coefficient jumps from 4.32% (model 2) to 7.16% (model 
3). The commercial banking variable still remains significantly different from 0. Each category 
of variables thus has significant power in explaining the severity of operational losses. The 
coefficients of the variables are relatively stable. 
We next select only those variables, which are statistically non-null at the 90% confidence level. 
We then regress the log of losses on the 5 remaining variables. The model thus constructed 
allows us to test whether the variables shown to be significant in the basic model will keep their 
explanatory power when tested alone. The results presented in model 4 of table 3 show that all 
the variables remain significantly non-null at the 90% confidence level. The adjusted coefficient 
of determination is on the order of 9.38%. The signs and scope of the variables do not change. 
These 5 significant variables will be used in developing the normalization formula. 
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5.6 Normalization Formula 
We are investigating a certain bank A and we want to find the equivalent value of a loss 
occurring in another financial institution B. A normalization formula will allow us to put a loss 
having occurred in bank B on the same scale as one in bank A. 
According to equation (2), a loss i is the product of a common component and of a function of 
the specific component. The regression analysis performed above allowed us to identify these 
two components. 
N  
 	
tic)Idiosyncra (g  log
54321
Comm) Comp. log(
0)(
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where: 
CB: refers to the commercial banking business line; 
CPBP: refers to the clients, products, and business practices risk type. 
As the common component is constant for all loss amounts, it is possible to re-write equation (2) 
as follows: 
 ( ) ( ) ( )Nidio
N
Bidio
B
Aidio
A
comm Compg
Loss
Compg
Loss
Compg
LossComp ==== ... . (5) 
Suppose that we have a loss which occurred in bank B and that we want to know its equivalent 
value if it occurred in bank A. Based on the analysis above, we can determine the idiosyncratic 
components of loss B as well as that of A. We multiply the coefficients already estimated by the 
corresponding value of the different variables to find the idiosyncratic or specific component. 
 
( )
( ) BBidio
Aidio
A LossCompg
Compg
Loss ×=   (6) 
with: 
( ) ( AAAAAAidio CPBPaCBaCanadaaUSaSizeaCompg 54321 ˆˆˆˆˆexp )++++= . 
 22
Equation (6) supposes that, in addition to the variables selected to perform the scaling, the 
unexplained part of the regression model (attributable to unobservable qualitative factors such as 
management quality, control environment, etc.) is supposed to be the same between LossA and 
LossB (third hypothesis). 
So, to calculate a loss sustained by a given bank in the banking industry, the idiosyncratic 
components of the two losses must first be calculated with the preceding equation. Next, we 
apply formula (6) to find the equivalent loss for bank A. By applying this same method to the 
whole external base, we obtain a base of extreme losses having occurred in other banking 
institutions but scaled to a given bank. The severity of losses has thus been adjusted by taking 
into account several factors such as size, location, business line, and risk type. 
5.7 Validation of the scaling severity model   
In order to concretize the scaling model, we have chosen the American bank Merrill Lynch4 
from the external base. This bank shows 52 loss events over the 1994-2004 period. We shall first 
scale the operational losses in the external base to this bank. We shall next compare the statistics 
on the losses actually observed to those found after the scaling procedure. 
Our first step is to determine the equivalent of the 1,056 loss events in the external base for the 
Merrill Lynch bank. We shall thus calculate the loss amount, which could occur at Merrill Lynch 
for the same type of risk, in the same line of business, and in the same year as the one in the 
external base. On the other hand, we shall take Merrill Lynch’s total assets in the year of the 
event and apply them to all the losses. And we shall take the United States as the place where all 
the external losses occur, since all the losses observed for Merrill Lynch did occur in the United 
States. Once the explanatory variables for regression (4) have been identified, we shall calculate 
the equivalent idiosyncratic component for each loss recorded in the external base (as shown in 
Appendix 1) and also include the coefficients of the variables previously estimated. The 
normalization formula presented in the preceding section allows us to scale the loss for the bank 
in question. 
                                                 
4 We have chosen this bank from the external base because it is the one with the maximum number of  losses of 
more than $1 million over the 1994-2004 period. 
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We next compare the statistics calculated on the sample of the 52 losses actually observed at 
Merrill Lynch to the statistics calculated on the 1, 0505 losses equivalent to those in the external 
base which could occur at the same bank. These statistics are presented in Table 4. They show 
that the averages of the two samples are quite close. A hypothesis test confirms this and shows 
that the two averages are statistically identical at a 95% threshold. It should also be noted that 
the standard deviations of the two samples are close. (83.1 vs. 84.3). 
In the second step of the analysis, we look to see what impact the scaling variables have on the 
loss amounts obtained after normalization. Table 5 presents the example of a loss-event at the 
Bank of New York drawn from the external base, along with loss amounts scaled to fictional 
banks. First of all, we modify one characteristic of the event at a time in order to see its monetary 
impact on the loss. We next analyze the aggregate effect of several variables on the loss amount. 
We note that, if the event took place in one of the larger banks (all other factors being equal), the 
loss amount would be slightly higher (rising from $8.26 M to $9.27 M, while the asset total has 
more than quadrupled). However, if the same event took place in Canada rather than the United 
States, the loss would be smaller in scope (it would go from $8.26 M to $4.97 M). As we have 
already shown, Canada’s environment is less risky than that of the United States. 
We also note that the commercial banking line of business where the loss-event occurred is more 
likely to produce heavy losses than the other lines of business. And the loss will move from 
$8.26 M to $16.06 M if it takes place in the commercial banking business line rather than the 
retail banking business line. Type of risk has also a big impact on the scope of losses. If the loss 
is of the clients, products, and business practices type, the amount will move to $15.56 M, given 
that this type of risk has a significant impact on the severity of losses, as already concluded in 
section 5.4. 
Finally, in the three last lines of table 5, we present the aggregated impact of two or more 
variables. We scale by modifying the size of the bank and the location of the event. Note that 
even if the bank is a larger one, the impact of location (Canada) wins out and the loss amount 
produced by scaling is lower than that of the original event. When the line of business and type 
                                                 
5 We have excluded 6 losses from the analysis because they represent outliers. 
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of risk are also modified, we find that the loss more than doubles. It is worth noting that the 
resulting loss is very different from the one found when size alone is modified. This analysis thus 
shows us that the size effect is quite weak compared to the other scaling factors. Our model is 
thus an improvement over models existing in the literature, which are based solely on size. 
6. Scaling model for frequency of external losses 
Remember that our objective is to correct the scaling bias so that a combination of internal and 
external data can be used to measure operational risk capital. In the preceding section, we 
worked out the scaling for loss amounts. It is thus possible to find several extreme losses likely 
to occur in our reference bank A. The question still to be asked is: How frequently will a bank 
sustain these losses? 
The scaling of frequencies is a notion, which rarely surfaces in the literature. Some researchers 
have developed models to scale severity, but the number of external losses, which should be 
combined with internal data, has not yet been modeled. In what follows, we propose a model, 
which allows us to adjust the number of external losses per bank and to scale it down to a given 
bank A. 
6.1 Description of the model 
With the model developed in this section, it is possible to scale the number of external losses and 
to determine what theoretical distribution fits to the frequencies. We expect that, on a given 
horizon, the number of losses per financial institution will depend on certain factors describing 
the characteristics of the financial institution. The institution’s size can indeed play an important 
role in determining the number of losses. It should be noted that the larger the bank, the more 
exposed it is to operational risks. If a bank does more transactions and has more assets, 
employees, and revenues than another, it will probably have more operational losses of various 
types (fraud, damage to assets…). And the geographical distribution of the institution’s activities 
can give us an idea of the effectiveness of its controls. The more widely dispersed a bank’s 
activities and, consequently, its measures of control, the less effective these measures will be. 
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It is thus possible to explain the number of losses by a regression over the different variables 
mentioned above. However, since we are dealing with frequencies and thus discrete variables, 
these numbers can be more suitably modeled with count data distributions such as the Poisson 
and negative binomial. So the count data regression model can be appropriately applied in this 
context. The advantage of these models is that they can both find the theoretical distribution 
adjustable to the frequency data and also provide flexible parameters suitable to each 
observation. In other terms, the distribution’s parameters depend on the variables identifying the 
characteristics of the financial institution where the loss occurred. Once the parameters have 
been estimated, it is possible to calculate those belonging to a given bank. 
Since the only institutions to which we have access are those, which have sustained losses, the 
frequencies are non-null. This bias must be corrected by using distributions truncated at zero. In 
what follows, we shall first describe the variables, which will be included in the model and then 
present and test each of the two models: the truncated Poisson regression model and the 
truncated negative binomial regression model. 
 6.2 Description of the variables 
We create a variable describing the number of over $1 M losses per financial institution over the 
1994-2004 period.6 This gives us a sample of 323 financial institutions having sustained losses 
of over $1 M which have been reported in the external base. Frequency will be explained based 
on a bank’s size and on the geographical distribution of its activities. We expect to find that the 
number of losses will increase with bank size and that control costs will grow and decrease in 
their effectiveness, as a financial institution expands the geographical distribution of its 
activities. 
Size will be estimated by the logarithm of the average total of the firm’s assets over the 1994-
2004 period. The geographical distribution will be estimated by binary variables such as: 
 US: Binary variable assuming the value 1 if the institution has had losses in the United 
States over the 1994-2004 period, otherwise 0. 
                                                 
6 We select this period for which the collection of losses is most exhaustive. 
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 Canada: Binary variable assuming the value 1 if the institution has had losses in Canada 
over the 1994-2004 period, otherwise 0. 
 Europe: Binary variable assuming the value 1 if the institution has had losses in Europe 
over the 1994-2004 period, otherwise 0. 
 Others: Binary variable assuming the value 1 if the institution has had losses in another 
country over the 1994-2004 period, otherwise 0. 
Unlike those in the model for severity, these variables are not mutually exclusive. Table 6a 
presents the descriptive statistics for the number of losses per bank as well as total assets per 
financial institution over the 1994-2004 period. The average number of losses of over $1 M is 
3.3 events per institution on an 11-year horizon, with a maximum of 52. The financial 
institutions vary greatly in size, the average total in assets being $123,174 M. With regard to the 
geographical distribution of the banks’ activities, we find that losses are more concentrated in the 
United States and in other countries (other than Canada, the United States, and Europe) Table 6b 
shows that banks of small and medium size (average assets under $400,000 M) suffer fewer 
losses over the 1994-2004 period than do large banks (average assets of between $400,000 and 
$800,000 M). And very large banks, with assets of over $800,000 M, have a higher number of 
losses (19) than the other banks. These statistics show a link between the financial institution’s 
size and the number of losses of over $1 M. 
Table 6c presents statistics on the number of losses per bank according to the geographical 
distribution of the activities of the institution in question. The results show that if activities are 
concentrated in the same country, the average number of losses is 2 per bank. But when activities 
are spread over two or three countries, the average varies between 8 and 10. The average number 
of losses per banking institution jumps to 28 when activities are very widely dispersed 
geographically. In modeling frequency, it is thus interesting to take the geographical distribution 
of activities into account. 
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 6.3 Truncated Poisson regression model 
If Yi — the number of losses sustained by company i over the 1994-2004 period—follows a 
Poisson distribution, then the probability of having y losses will be: 
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where λ  is the Poisson parameter. The main characteristic of this distribution is 
( ) ( ) λ== YVarYE ii . 
However, as we are in the presence of zero truncated data, the probability of the number of 
conditional losses must be estimated on the fact that the frequencies observed are strictly 
superior to zero. The conditional probability is: 
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We can, moreover, allow parameter λ  to vary from one observation to the next. Let 
( )λ ii βXexp =  where Xi is a vector of (1 × m) exogenous variables (characteristics of the firms 
where the loss occurred) and β  a vector of (m × 1) coefficients. The exponential function allows 
the non-negativity of parameter iλ . 
In our context, the parameter iλ  takes the form: 
 ( )( )iiiiii OthersEuropeCanadaUSAssets 543210 lnexp β+β+β+β+β+β=λ . (7) 
Therefore, the probability that a financial institution i would have y losses over an 11-year 
horizon (when its specific characteristics are known) is: 
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It should be noted that, unlike the Poisson, the truncated Poisson distribution does not present an 
equidispersion. In fact, the first and second moments are: 
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iγ  is called an adjustment factor. It is interpreted as being the difference between the averages of 
the truncated and non-truncated distributions. The average of the truncated distribution is in fact 
higher than that of the non-truncated distribution. However, the variance of the truncated 
distribution is smaller, as the preceding expressions show. 
The vector of the β  parameters can be estimated using the maximum likelihood method (see 
Maddala, 1983 and Cameron and Trivedi, 1986, for a detailed discussion on the estimation 
methods of the Poisson regression models). It is thus a matter of estimating the six coefficients of 
equation (7) and of calculating parameter iλ  for each exposure unit i (a firm in our case). It is 
thus possible to calculate a given bank’s λ  parameter by retaining the estimated coefficients and 
taking the size and geographical distribution variables of the bank in question. 
 6.4 Truncated negative binomial regression model 
In the preceding model, the exogenous variables may not contain all the information to explain 
the number of conditional losses. To compensate for this restriction, we introduce an error term 
in the definition of the Poisson parameter that can be written: 
 . (9) ( )( )iiiiiii OthersEuropeCanadaUSAssets ε+β+β+β+β+β+β=λ 543210* lnexp
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The term iε  constitutes the error specification arising from the omitted (unobserved) explanatory 
variables, which are independent of the model’s exogenous Xi variables. Contrary to the 
preceding model,  is a random variable. The conditional distributions of  Yi  becomes: *iλ
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with ( )ig ε  as the density function of iε . 
For convenience sake, we suppose, in what follows, that ( )ii εμ exp=  follows a gamma 
distribution of parameter α  such that: 
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The conditional distribution of Yi is a truncated negative binomial whose density is: 
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The mean and the variance of the truncated negative binomial regression are the following: 
( )       ; 0| * i* γ+λ==> iiiii uXyyE  
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As for the Poisson distribution, the average of the truncated negative binomial distribution is 
higher than that of the non-truncated one. And the point-zero truncation has reduced the variance 
by the adjustment factor . Though the truncated Poisson distribution no longer shows the 
equidispersion characteristic 
*
( )
iγ
( )>( )iiiiii XyyVXyyE   ;  0|  ;  0| ≠> , the truncated negative 
binomial model introduces overdispersion, in the sense that its variance is higher than that of the 
Poisson. 
Under the hypothesis that the density is correctly specified and that the other usual conditions are 
met, a maximum likelihood estimation of the parameters β  and α  can be performed. It is thus a 
matter of estimating the six coefficients of equation (9) as well as the coefficient α . It is thus 
possible to calculate the parameter  for a given bank. We thus retain the estimated coefficients 
and take the size and geographical distribution variables of the bank in question. However, if the 
density is poorly specified, the maximum likelihood estimators of the negative binomial 
regression model will not be consistent.  
*
iλ
 6.5 Presentation and comparison of results 
The results obtained from estimating the parameters of the two models are summed up in table 7. 
Note that the estimated coefficients have the same signs for both models. The signs confirm our 
expectations. In fact, the positive size and geographical distribution coefficients show that the 
number of losses do increase with the bank’s size and the distribution of its activities across 
different environments. 
In the truncated Poisson regression model, all the explanatory variables introduced in the 
regression are statistically significant at confidence levels ranging between 90% and 99%. They 
thus have an explanatory impact on the number of losses. As to the truncated negative binomial 
regression model, the coefficients of the variables Europe and Others are not statistically 
different from zero. 
In order to compare the two models and to test for the existence of overdispersion in data, we run 
an overdispersion test specifically designed for truncated regression models by Gurmu (1991). 
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0=The test consists in testing the null hypothesis H0: α  against the alternative hypothesis 
H1: 0>α . 
Let  be the vector of the coefficients and  the maximum-likelihood estimator 
of 
⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛= α
βρ ⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛=
0
ˆ
ˆ βρ
ρ  under the null hypothesis. In what follows, the symbol ^ indicates that the parameters are 
evaluated at point ρˆ  under the hypothesis stipulating that 0=α . 
The statistic of the Score test or the Lagarange multiplier used to test for overdispersion in the 
truncated Poisson regression model is calculated as follows: 
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LE  is the information matrix.7
Under the hypothesis H0: 0=α . The value of statistic τ  based on the truncated negative 
binomial distribution at point zero is 34, 637. The test thus reject of the null hypothesis. The 
result shows the existence of significant overdispersion in the data, indicating that it is suitably 
modeled with the negative binomial distribution. 
To find the parameters of the distribution selected for a given bank, it is simply a matter of 
calculating parameter  using equation (9) along with the coefficients already calculated and *
                                                
iλ
 
7 Refer to the Gurmu study (1991) for more details on the evaluation of information matrices at point ρˆ . 
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the value of the variables for this bank over the period in question. It is thus possible to generate 
a number of $1 M+ losses a bank might sustain, based on its own frequency distribution. 
To concretize our frequency scaling, we use the example of a bank whose assets total $100, 000 
M and whose activities are divided between the United States and Canada over the 1994-2004 
period. We show how we calculate the parameter of the Poisson distribution using equation (7) 
in the table 8a and the parameters of the negative binomial distribution using equation (9) in the 
table 8b, along with the coefficients already estimated and the appropriate values of the 
variables.  
From the description in table 8b, we see that it is possible to calculate the parameters of the 
negative binomial distribution. Equation (9) does make it possible to calculate the average 
number of losses on an 11-year horizon for the bank used as an example. 
Using the frequency distribution selected for a given bank, we can generate a number of $1 M+ 
losses, which could occur in that bank over an 11-year period. We can then make a random draw 
of over $1 M loss amounts from the base scaled to the bank in question, according to the 
frequency generated. By calculating the total loss over the period in question and by repeating 
these steps several times, we thus generate a distribution of the extreme losses a bank could 
sustain over 11 years. It is thus possible to use the aggregated distribution to calculate statistics 
such as the average and different quintiles. 
7. Conclusion and discussion 
The use of external data is a regulatory requirement for banks seeking to develop an advanced 
method of calculating operational risk capital. This use must, however, be relevant and unbiased. 
Since we believe that all banks are exposed to infrequent but potentially heavy operational 
losses, it is imperative that they supplement their internal loss data with data on extreme external 
losses. This will allow them to make better estimations of distribution tails. 
The objective of this study was to construct a scaling model for the severity and frequency of 
external losses in order to correct the scaling bias and to make better use of external losses. The 
results of the OLS estimation have shown that size, location (United States and Canada) as well 
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as business line (commercial banking) and risk type (clients, products and business practices) 
should be considered in explaining a part of the external loss amounts. A normalization formula 
allows us to take a loss observed in the industry and scale it to a reference bank. We have 
validated our model by comparing the actual losses observed in a bank with those found after 
scaling. The results show that the two samples have statistically equal averages and very similar 
standard deviations. 
A model for scaling and adjusting frequencies has also been developed in response to the need to 
scale the number of losses. This model’s originality (previously overlooked in the literature) is 
its ability to scale external frequencies to a given bank over a determined horizon. This same 
model can also generate a number of random $1 M and over losses, which could possibly occur 
in a bank. Two models have been tested: the truncated Poisson regression model and the 
truncated negative binomial regression model. The results show that the latter outperforms the 
former. Frequencies are scaled by calculating the distribution parameters of the bank in question. 
These parameters depend on the financial institution’s characteristics, such as the size and 
geographical distribution of its activities. 
It would be interesting to extend this model by finding the distribution of severity most suitably 
to fit to the loss amounts found after scaling. This would make it possible to generate losses of 
over $1 M randomly. The number of losses generated would be given by the negative binomial 
model used in this paper. It is thus possible to calculate operational capital based on scaled 
external losses. Other promising areas of research would be finding the best ways to combine 
internal and external data or determining what weight should be assigned to capital calculated on 
internal data as opposed to capital calculated on external data. 
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Table 1: Descriptive Statistics on the Data 
The following tables present descriptive statistics on losses according to size of financial institution, location of 
event, risk type  and  business line in which the event occurred. 
 
Table 1a: Loss statistics according to size of financial institution, estimated by total assets in millions of dollars. 
The banks are classified in three categories: those with assets under $400, 000 M; those with assets between 
$400,000 M and $800, 000 M; and those of greater size with total assets of over $800 billion. 
Total assets (Millions of dollars) Whole sample  
Assets < 400 000 400 000 ≤ Assets <800 000 Assets ≥ 800 000  
Average of losses 
(Millions of dollars) 69.079 51.422 115.570 67.154 
Number of losses 781 231 44 1,056 
Standard deviation of 
losses (Millions of 
dollars) 
594.895 114.625 408.972 521.044 
 
Table 1b: Statistics on operational losses according to location of event. Locations have been classified in three 
categories: United States, Canada, Europe and Other countries. 
Location 
 
United States Canada Europe Other countries 
Average of losses 
(Millions of dollars) 38.424 8.964 75.204 162.512 
Number of losses 635 42 177 202 
Standard deviation of 
losses 
(Millions of dollars) 
147.215 14.987 168.605 1,148.548 
 
Table 1c: Statistics of the total assets of financial institutions according to location of event. Locations have been 
classified in four categories: United States, Canada, Europe, and Other countries. 
Location 
 
United States Canada Europe Other countries 
Average of assets 
(Millions of dollars) 272,673.036 220,107.561 357,057.401 199,247.953 
Standard deviation of 
assets (Millions of 
dollars) 
277,926.188 288,945.739 283,704.460 225,372.722 
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Table 1d: Statistics of operational losses according to business lines in which the losses occurred. We have selected 
the classification proposed by Basel II, including 8 lines of business: RB, PS, CF, AM, TS, AS, CB, RB*. 
Business lines 
 
RB PS CF AM TS AS CB RB 
Average of 
losses 
(Millions of 
dollars) 
23.225 35.078 87.504 50.549 89.287 29.429 133.333 39.550 
Number of 
losses 174 52 55 56 82 24 268 345 
Standard 
deviation 
(Millions of 
dollars) 
63.164 79.545 361.277 90.866 280.857 41.791 993.640 131.195 
* RB: Retail brokerage; PS: Payment and settlement; CF: Corporate finance; AM: Asset management; TS: Trading 
and sales; AS: Agency services; CB: Commercial banking; RB: Retail banking. 
 
Table 1e: Statistics of operational losses according to risk types. We use the classification proposed by Basel II, 
which includes 7 types of risk: DPA, CPBP, EPWS, EF, IF, EDPM, BDSF**. 
Risk types  
DPA CPBP EPWS EF IF EDPM BDSF 
Average of 
losses 
(Millions of 
dollars) 
114.597 61.014 11.59 97.856 64.196 67.528 4.993 
Number of 
losses 4 460 57 222 227 80 6 
Standard 
deviation of 
losses 
(Millions of 
dollars) 
168.831 179.294 18.502 1074.485 194.352 306.819 4.022 
**DPA: Damage to physical assets; CPBP: Clients, products, and business practices; EPWS: Employment practices 
and workplace safety; EF: External fraud; IF: Internal fraud; EDPM: Execution, delivery, and process management; 
BDSF: Business disruption and system failures. 
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Table 2: Results from the Estimation of the Linear Regression Parameters 
The following table presents the results obtained from estimating the linear regression coefficients with the ordinary 
least squares method. The figures in italics are the P-value statistics 
Variable Basic model 
Constant 0.799
 
(0.273) 
Log (assets) 0.077
*** 
(0.005) 
US -0.541
*** 
(0.000) 
Canada -1.087
*** 
(0.000) 
Europe -0.053 (0.755) 
Retail brokerage 0.115 (0.641) 
Corporate finance 0.386
 
(0.199) 
Asset management 0.398
 
(0.184) 
Trading and sales 0.417
 
(0.140) 
Commercial banking 0.797
*** 
(0.001) 
Retail banking 0.043 (0.858) 
Agency services 0.478
 
(0.213) 
Damages to physical assets 1.300
 
(0.196) 
Clients, products, and business practices 1.123
* 
(0.079) 
Employment, practices and workplace safety 0.088 (0.895) 
External fraud 0.360 (0.578) 
Internal fraud 0.731 (0.257) 
Execution, delivery, and process management 0.577 (0.381) 
F(18, 1037) 8.38 (0.000) 
R2 12.07% 
R2adj 10.63% 
***Coefficient significant at the 99% confidence level. 
** Coefficient significant at the 95%à confidence level. 
* Coefficient significant at the 90% confidence level. 
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Table 3: Robustness Tests 
This table presents robustness tests. Models (1) to (3) are used to test the stability of each category of variables in 
the basic model. Model (4) contains only the non-null significant variables in the scaling model. The figures in 
italics are P-value statistics. 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Constant 1.495
*** 
(0.000) 
1.797*** 
(0.000) 
1.713*** 
(0.000) 
1.379*** 
(0.000) 
Log (assets) 0.076
** 
(0.007) 
0.084*** 
(0.003) 
0.077*** 
(0.006) 
0.082*** 
(0.001) 
US  -0.583
*** 
(0.000) 
-0.446** 
(0.001) 
-0.595*** 
(0.000) 
Canada  -1.219
*** 
(0.000) 
-1.055*** 
(0.000) 
-1.102*** 
(0.000) 
Europe  0.020
 
(0.907) 
0.083 
(0.624)  
Retail brokerage   -0.275 (0.271)  
Corporate finance   0.423
 
(0.166)  
Assets management   0.369
 
(0.225)  
Trading and sales   0.148 (0.599)  
Commercial banking   0.455
* 
(0.062) 
0.665*** 
(0.000) 
Retail banking   -0.200 (0.398)  
Agency services   0.383 (0.327)  
Clients, products and 
business practices    
0.633*** 
(0.000) 
F 7.6 (0.000) 
12.91 
(0.000) 
8.39 
(0.000) 
22.84 
(0.000) 
R2 0.69% 4.68% 8.12% 9.81% 
R2adj 0.60% 4.32% 7.16% 9.38% 
***Coefficient significant at the 99% confidence level. 
** Coefficient significant at the 95% confidence level. 
* Coefficient significant at the 90% confidence level. 
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Table 4: Statistics on Scaled Losses 
 
The second column of this table presents statistics pertaining to losses actually observed in the Merrill Lynch bank. 
In the third column, we also present statistics calculated on the amounts  of external losses scaled to the bank in 
question. Appendix 1 shows in detail how the scaling was done. 
  Observed losses at Merrill Lynch Scaled external losses to Merrill Lynch  
Average ($M) 38.868  35.359  
Median ($M) 11.053  7.941  
Standard deviation ($M) 83.106  84.298  
Kurtosis coefficient 21.112 35.733 
Skewness coefficient 4.282 5.272 
Minimum ($M) 1.081  0.591  
Maximum ($M) 506.154 902.126 
Number of losses 52 1,050 
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Table 5: Impact of Scaled Variables on Loss amounts 
 
In this table, we present a loss event extracted from the external base, along with equivalent scaled losses. In each 
case, we modify a scaling variable to observe its impact on the loss amount. 
Bank Loss amount Total assets Location Business line Risk type 
Event extracted from external base 
Bank of New York $8.26 M $48,879 M United States Retail banking External fraud 
Scaled event 
Fictional bank 1 $9.27 M $200,000 M United States Retail banking  External fraud 
Fictional bank 2 $4.97 M $48,879 M Canada Retail banking  External fraud 
Fictional bank 3 $16.06 M $48,879 M United States Commercial banking  External fraud 
Fictional bank 4 $15.56 M $48,879 M United States Retail banking  
Clients, products 
and business 
practices 
Fictional bank 5 $5.58 M $200,000 M Canada Retail banking  External fraud 
Fictional bank 6 $10.86 M $200,000 M Canada Commercial banking  External fraud 
Fictional bank 7 $20.46 M $200,000 M Canada Commercial banking  
Clients, products 
and business 
practices 
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Table 6: Descriptive Statistics on Variables Introduced in the Frequency Model 
The following tables present statistics on the distribution of the number of losses per bank, according to the 
financial institution’s size and the geographical distribution of its activities over the 1994-2004 period. 
Table 6a: Statistics calculated on the number of losses and the total assets per bank over the 1994-2004 period. 
 Average Standard deviation Median Minimum Maximum 
Number of losses 
per bank 3.27 6.13 1 1 52 
Total assets per 
bank $123,174 M $181,820 M $34,003 M $43 M $887,515 M 
 
Table 6b: Statistics for the number of losses per bank according to the financial institution’s size estimated based on 
its total assets in millions of dollars. The banks have been classified in three categories: those with under $400,000 
M in average assets over the 1994-2004 period; those with between $400,000 M and $800,000 M in average assets; 
and those of great size with an average of more than $800,000 M over the period in question. 
Total assets (millions of dollars) 
 
Assets < 400 000 400 000 ≤ Assets <800 000 Assets  ≥ 800 000 
Average number of losses 
per bank 2.587 8.538 19 
Number of banks 293 26 4 
Standard deviation of the 
number of losses per bank 4.647 10.879 18.166 
 
Table 6c: Statistics on the number of operational losses, according to level of geographical distribution of activities. 
We consider 4 different environments: the United States, Canada, Europe and Other countries. The columns of the 
following table show whether the activities are concentrated in the same environment or spread over 2, 3 or 4 
environments. 
Geographical Distribution  
 
One environment Two environments 
Three 
environments 
Four 
environments 
Average number of losses 
per bank 2 10 7.667 28 
Number of banks 275 33 12 3 
Standard deviation of the 
number of losses per bank 2.957 12.661 4.559 13.077 
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Table 7: Results of the Estimation of the Coefficients in the Frequency Model 
The following table presents the results of the estimation of the coefficients in the frequency scaling model. The 
estimation is made using the maximum likelihood method. The last line gives the result of the Score test or the 
Lagrange multiplier test, making it possible to compare the two models. The figures in italics represent t-Student. 
 Truncated Poisson regression model 
Truncated negative binomial 
regression model 
Constant -5.876
*** 
(-15.28) 
-10.439*** 
(-8.35) 
Log (assets) 1.176
*** 
(15.30) 
1.783*** 
(8.45) 
United States 1.432
*** 
(14.20) 
2.000*** 
(6.60) 
Canada 0.559
*** 
(5.51) 
1.721*** 
(2.83) 
Europe 0.141
* 
(1.73) 
-0.111 
(-0.34) 
Other countries 0.191
** 
(2.43) 
0.457 
(1.52) 
α   4.347 (1.53) 
Log (likelihood function) -695.314 -439.414 
Score test  34.637 
***Coefficient significant at the 99% confidence level. 
** Coefficient significant at the 95% confidence level 
* Coefficient significant at the 90% confidence level 
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Table 8: Frequency Scaling Results 
This table presents an application of the frequency scaling model. We consider a bank whose average in total assets 
is evaluated at $100, 000 M over the 1994-2004 period. Its activities are divided mainly between the United States 
and Canada. Below, we determine the parameters of the Poisson distribution and the negative binomial for each 
bank. 
 
Table 8a: Poisson regression model. 
Constant Ln  (assets) 
 
0β  1β  
United States
2β  
Canada 
3β  
Europe 
4β  
Other 
countries 
5β  
 Poisson 
parameter*
Coefficients -5.876 1.176 1.432 0.559 0.141 0.191  7.352
* 
Variables  Ln (100000) 1 1 0 0  
 
* ( )( )iiiiii OthersEuropeCanadaUSAssets 543210 lnexp β+β+β+β+β+β=λ  
 
Table 8b: Negative binomial regression model 
 
Constant 
0β  
Ln  (assets) 
1β  
United 
States 
2β  
Canada
3β  
Europe 
4β  
Others
5β  
Gamma 
parameter  α   
Negative 
binomial 
parameters** 
(r,p) 
Coefficients -10.439 1.783 2 1.721 -0.111 0.457 4.347  (0.23; 0.025)**
Variables  Ln  (100000) 1 1 0 0    
** 
α
1=r  
   p = ( )( )iiiii OthersEuropeCanadaUSAssetslnexp 5432101
1
β+β+β+β+β+βα+  
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Appendix 1 
In the tables below, we present three examples of losses extracted from the external base and we show in detail how 
the scaling is done. 
 
Bank Observed loss ($M) Year 
Total assets 
($M) Location Business line Risk type 
BankAmerica 
Corp. 4.70 1994 169,604 United States 
Trading and 
sales 
Clients, 
products and 
business 
practices 
Crédit 
Lyonnais 117.95 1997 250,279 Europe Retail banking  Internal fraud 
Bank of 
Montreal 10.83 2002 157,780 Canada 
Commercial 
banking  Internal fraud 
 
We scale these losses to the Merrill Lynch bank. We retain the business line, the risk type, and the year of loss 
recorded in the database. 
Bank Scaled loss ($M) Year 
Total assets 
($M) Location Business line Risk type 
Merrill 
Lynch 
To be 
determined 1994 163,749 
United 
States 
Trading and 
sales 
Clients, products 
and business 
practices 
Merrill 
Lynch 
To be 
determined 1997 292,819 
United 
States Retail banking  Internal fraud 
Merrill 
Lynch 
To be 
determined 2002 447,928 
United 
States 
Commercial 
banking  Internal fraud 
 
To find the equivalent loss, we must use regression (4) to determine the idiosyncratic components of the losses in 
the external database as well as those at Merrill Lynch. 
Bank Observed loss 
(external loss) (A)
Idiosyncratic 
component 
(external loss) (B) 
Idiosyncratic 
component 
(Merrill Lynch) (C) 
Loss scaled to 
Merrill Lynch 
(D) = A × C/B 
BankAmerica Corp. 4.70 2.78a 2.79d 4.69 
Crédit Lyonnais 117.95 2.77b 1.55e 66.00 
Bank of Montreal 10.83 2.73c 3.13f 19.59 
a 2.79 = exp (0.082 × ln (Assets) − 0.595 × US − 1.102 × Canada + 0.665 × CB + 0.633 × CPBP) 
   = exp (0.082 × ln (169,604) − 0.595 × 1 − 1.102 × 0 + 0.665 × 0 + 0.633 × 1) 
 
b 2.77 = exp (0.082 × ln (Assets) − 0.595 × US − 1.102 × Canada + 0.665 × CB + 0.633 × CPBP) 
   = exp (0.082 × ln (250,279) − 0.595 × 0 − 1.102 × 0 + 0.665 × 0 + 0.633 × 0) 
 
c 1.73 = exp (0.082 × ln (Assets) − 0.595 × US − 1.102 × Canada + 0.665 × CB + 0.633 × CPBP) 
   = exp (0.082 × ln (157,780) × 0.595 × 0 − 1.102 × 1 + 0.665 × 1 + 0.633 × 0) 
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d 2.79 = exp (0.082 × ln (Assets) − 0.595 × US − 1.102 × Canada + 0.665 × CB + 0.633 × CPBP) 
   = exp (0.082 × ln (163,749) − 0.595 × 1 − 1.102 × 0 + 0.665 × 0 + 0.633 × 1) 
 
e 1.55= exp (0.082 × ln (Assets) − 0.595 × US − 1.102 × Canada + 0.665 × CB + 0.633 × CPBP) 
   = exp (0.082 × ln (292,819) − 0.595 × 1 − 1.102 × 0 + 0.665 × 0 + 0.633 × 0) 
 
f 3.13 = exp (0.082 × ln (Assets) − 0.595 × US −  1.102 × Canada + 0.665 × CB + 0.633 × CPBP) 
   = exp (0.082 × ln (447,928) − 0.595 × 1 − 1.102 × 0 + 0.665 × 1 + 0.633 × 0) 
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